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WHO LEADS IN A G-ZERO WORLD? MULTI-NATIONALS, 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 
 
Avi Sharma† 
Abstract: The UN Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) aim to create a more 
peaceful, just, and environmentally sustainable global community.  The SDGs target seventeen 
areas that demand immediate action by the international community, including the eradication 
of poverty, gender equality, climate change mitigation, and resilience building.  Unfortunately, 
the world’s most powerful nation-state actors are unlikely to make the costly investments 
required to achieve the goals laid out in this ambitious UN document.  In fact, this article argues 
that nation-state actors have powerful disincentives to play a leadership role in advancing the 
SDGs.  The question then becomes: if nation-states are unable or unwilling to make these 
investments, who will? 
This article shows that Multinational Corporations (“MNCs”) have a unique capacity to 
address critical global challenges—not because they are more efficient, agile, or altruistic than 
other kinds of institutional actors.  Rather, MNCs have the potential to make an impact on issues 
from gender equality to sustainable development because they have a different incentive 
structure than nation-state actors.  Unlike nation-states that answer to constituencies that are 
fundamentally parochial in their outlook, MNCs answer to stakeholders who are disposed 
toward more—rather than less—global engagement.  More specifically, this article analyzes the 
incentives that MNCs have to invest in the SDGs.  It does not attempt to resolve political and 
ethical questions raised by the privatization of the intergovernmental responsibility to protect 
human and natural resources on a global scale.  It does argue that in the face of critical global 
challenges, this private sector intervention is preferable to government inaction. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the coming century, the international community faces extraordinary 
challenges, ranging from unprecedented demographic shifts1 to a warming planet.2  
In the face of truly global challenges, the need for international collaboration has 
never been greater.  Nation-state actors have historically played a core role in 
addressing these shared challenges, and particularly when it comes to delivering 
humanitarian assistance in crisis situations, members of the Organisation for 
                                                          
†  Sharma is a researcher with the Berlin-based Center for Cultural Diplomacy Studies.  He is currently 
developing a project that explores the social and political consequences of climate change, focusing in particular on 
the Trans-Atlantic response to climate driven migration and other humanitarian crises.  Sharma has a Ph.D. in 
European and Global History from the University of Chicago. 
1 Susana Adamo, Environmentally Induced Population Displacements, IHDP 13-21 (2009), available at 
http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/environinduced-s.adamo-IHDPupdate-2009.pdf. 
2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (2014), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/. 
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Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) continue to serve the role of 
first responders.3  But when it comes to slow-moving crises (like climate 
adaptation and change mitigation), challenges that are potentially unpopular with 
domestic audiences (e.g., hosting refugees), or that require durable investment 
(e.g., education, public health, and physical infrastructure), the world’s most 
powerful nation-state actors are consistently failing to address our most pressing 
21st century problems. 
Germany, for example, may have played a leadership role in efforts to 
manage the ongoing Eurozone crisis, but it has failed to mobilize EU partners to 
contain conflicts in Central and North Africa4 and the Middle East.5  In the United 
States, leaders on both sides of the political fence seem committed to a less-rather-
than-more-engaged foreign policy.  And while China is clearly in a position to take 
a larger role in addressing critical global challenges, the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party (“CCCCP”) has repeatedly signaled that international 
affairs are subordinate to domestic considerations.6  Examples from the South 
China Seas, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, North Korea, and Ukraine 
show that existing mechanisms for managing global crises are inadequate. 7  This is 
particularly alarming in the face of climate change, which scientific observers 
agree demands immediate and comprehensive action.8  The trend towards 
                                                          
3 A long-standing body of international obligations suggests that, in the near term, this will continue to be 
true.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), GUIDELINES ON DISASTER MITIGATION (1994), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/7/1887740.pdf; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON 
HUMANITARIAN AID (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf (citing 
EU member obligations to provide “adequate and effective aid” to “man-made and natural disasters,” including 
those precipitated by climate change). 
4 Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, International Efforts to Protect Civilians in Central African 
Republic Failing to Stop Slaughter (Feb. 18, 2014), available at: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-
stories/press-release/international-efforts-protect-civilians-central-african-republic-failing. 
5
 Germany Proceeds with Caution in Syria Conflict, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.dw.de/germany-proceeds-with-caution-in-syria-policy/a-17050654 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
6 Fareed Zakaria is just one of those who argue that rising powers including Brazil, Russia, India China, 
Turkey, and South Africa (BRICTS) will play a more important role in global affairs.  But even a cursory 
comparison between G-7 and G-20 Foreign Aid budgets shows that “rising powers” cannot be expected to fill the 
vacuum if Trans-Atlantic Partners retreat from their existing obligations.  In 2011, for example, combined Foreign 
Aid Spending for Brazil, Russia, India, and China totaled $4.2 billion.  See Pete Troilo, Despite Tempered Outlook, 
BRIC Countries Stay the Course on Foreign Aid, DEVEX.COM (Nov. 25, 2013), 
https://www.devex.com/news/despite-tempered-outlook-bric-countries-stay-the-course-on-foreign-aid-82370.  This 
is just 12% of the US Foreign Aid Budget for the same year. See U.S. Foreign Aid Since 1977, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/04/us/politics/us-foreign-aid-since-1977.html?_r=1&. 
7 In recent years, the UN Security Council has come under particular criticism.  See What Criticism has the 
Security Council Faced?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-
alliances/un-security-council/p31649. 
8 The 2009 Copenhagen Accord called on developed countries to invest $100 billion per year to help 
developing countries mitigate climate change, starting in 2020, and some estimates range much higher.  Alex Bowen 
et al., A Macroeconomic Perspective on Climate Change Mitigation: Meeting the Finance Challenge 10 (Ctr. for 
Climate Change Econ. & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 142, 2013), available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WP122-Macroeconomic-perspective-on-
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disengagement has only intensified since the onset of the “Great Recession” in 
2008.9  Ian Bremmer calls this new alignment the G-Zero: it is a world without 
leadership.10 
Given the peculiarity of our historical moment, the retreat from international 
obligations should not be particularly surprising.  Faced with a changing global 
balance of power, dominant and rising nations are preoccupied with promises 
made to domestic audiences.11  This means that, while the imperative to invest in 
public health infrastructure, educational empowerment, gender equality, and 
climate initiatives in distant lands may be dire, calls at home for more jobs, a 
balanced budget, or a better funded social safety net (or deficit reduction) take 
primacy.12  Put simply, politicians—elected or otherwise—are more concerned 
with national interests than international obligations.13  The developing world, 
where billions of citizens continue to live on the margins of survival, will most 
keenly feel the effects of this retreat from international obligations.14  All of this 
raises doubts about whether, and to what extent, nation-state actors can be counted 
on to address our most pressing global challenges.  If not the nation-state, then 
who?15 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
climate-change-mitigation.pdf.  The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that public 
financing for adaptation reached $23-26 billion in the fiscal year 2012-13, noting that this number will rise to $ 100 
billion by 2020.  UNEP warns of “a significant funding gap unless new and additional finance for adaptation is 
made available.”  See UNITED NATIONS, UNEP REPORT: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ ADAPTATION COSTS LIKELY TO 
FAR SURPASS PREVIOUS ESTIMATES (Dec. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.un.org/climatechange/blog/2014/12/unep-report-developing-countries-adaptation-costs-likely-far-
surpass-previous-estimates/. 
9 See MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE FRUGAL SUPERPOWER: AMERICA’S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP IN A CASH-
STRAPPED ERA (2010). 
10 See IAN BREMMER, EVERY NATION FOR ITSELF: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN NO ONE LEADS THE WORLD (2012).  
For a different view, which stresses the importance of “mini-lateral” agreements, see Stewart Patrick, The Unruled 
World: The Case for Good Enough Global Governance, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2014), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-12-06/unruled-world. 
11 See MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (2012). 
12 This is as true of one party states like the PRC as it is of Western-style democracies.  Many will object to 
this parallel, pointing to the use of police and military powers to fabricate consent in much of the world.  But if one 
looks at populist policies in Venezuela, the CPC’s concern with civil unrest in the provinces, or the effects of 
popular uprisings in Egypt, Turkey, Syria, or Ukraine, it should be clear that even authoritarian regimes must be 
wary of domestic constituencies.  Nafeez Ahmed, Global Riot Epidemic due to Demise of Cheap Fossil Fuels, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/feb/28/global-riots-
protests-end-cheap-fossil-fuels-ukraine-venezuela. 
13 See, e.g., DETLEV PEUKERT, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC: THE CRISIS OF CLASSICAL MODERNITY (1992) 
(extreme example); Miles Kahler, Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status 
Quo, 89 INT’L AFF. 711 (2013) (recent discussion). 
14 The World Bank estimates that more than 1 billion people live in “extreme poverty,” with average earnings 
at or below USD $1.25 per day.  The same report projected that more than 2 billion earn USD $2 a day, which 
represents “the average poverty line in developing countries.”  WORLD BANK, POVERTY OVERVIEW (last updated 
Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview. 
15 Faced with our most entrenched global challenges—reducing carbon emissions, and improving education, 
public health, and economic opportunities in the developing world—even conservative observers have indicated that 
investment is on the decline, and strategic vision is lacking.  See WORLD BANK, CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT WARNS 
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Many believe that Inter-Governmental Organizations (“IGOs”) should take 
the lead in protecting the world’s most vulnerable citizens.16  IGOs have long 
played a key part in protecting our global commons,17 and the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (“UN SDGs”) are only the most recent in a long 
list of initiatives18 to build a more “just, equitable and inclusive”19 world.  So far, 
more than 1.3 million stakeholders have participated in negotiations identifying the 
goals, and have agreed on seventeen “Universal Principles” including poverty 
eradication, women’s empowerment, sustainable industrialization, and climate 
change mitigation.  The UN SDGs outcome document, which details the results of 
this collaboration between diverse stakeholders, is an achievement in its own 
right.20  
But a recent High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development Goals 
suggests that agreement on the principles is likely to be the easy part.  While 
member states agreed on the Universal Principles expressed in the SDGs, they 
“differed” in their views on how to advance the SDGs, and “what a transformed 
world should look like.”21  Given the political, economic, religious, and cultural 
differences within the General Assembly, agreeing to the details of the Post-2015 
Agenda will be extraordinarily difficult.  However, funding the Post-2015 agenda 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
DRAMATICALLY WARMER WORLD THIS CENTURY (Nov. 18, 2012), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/11/18/Climate-change-report-warns-dramatically-warmer-world-
this-century. 
16
 See generally Gustavo Ferroni, Corporate Social Responsibility and Rio+20: Time to Leap Forward!,  
DIALOGUE ON A CONVENTION FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (CSRA) 
(2012), available at http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/328Convention_CSRA_Discussion_Paper.pdf. 
17 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) uses a narrower definition. “The ‘Global Commons’ 
refers to resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political reach of any one nation-state.  Thus international 
law identifies four global commons namely: the High Seas; the Atmosphere; Antarctica; and, Outer Space.”  UNITED 
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CONVENTIONS, IEG OF THE GLOBAL 
COMMONS BACKGROUND, http://www.unep.org/delc/GlobalCommons/tabid/54404/ (last visited May 16, 2015); see 
KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998) (providing 
a broader definition). 
18 SDG negotiations are just the last iteration of a process reaching back more than 20 years.  Earlier avatars 
of the SDGs include Agenda 21 (1992), the Global Compact (1999), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(2000), Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights (2003), and Rio+20 (2012).  See also UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SYNTHESIS REPORT ON 
OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE POST-2015 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/700&Lang=E (paying particular attention to items 26 and 
27). 
19 UNITED NATIONS, INTRODUCTION AND PROPOSED GOALS AND TARGETS ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
FOR THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 1 (June 3, 2014), available at 
https://www.worldwewant2015.org/node/442161. 
20 UNITED NATIONS, OPEN WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2014), 
available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1579SDGs%20Proposal.pdf. 
21  Summary: Second Round of Intergovernmental Negotiations On Post-2015, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
2015, http://www.sustainabledevelopment2015.org/index.php/news/284-news-sdgs/1637-summary-second-round-
of-intergovernmental-negotiations-on-post-2015 (last visited May 16, 2015). 
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is likely to be even more challenging.22  The Special Representative on Post-2015 
Development Planning estimates an annual price tag of USD 5–7 trillion for 
infrastructure projects alone,23 which amounts to between 6–9 percent of Global 
GDP.24  For those who expect IGOs to take the lead in realizing the SDGs, it is 
worth remembering that UN member states regularly fail to reach even the 
threshold of 0.7 percent of GDP prescribed for Official Development Assistance 
(“ODA”) by successive UN Resolutions.25  Achieving a workable “post-2015 
Agenda” will require UN member-states to make costly commitments that are 
often unpopular with domestic audiences.26  The question remains, who will lead in 
a G-Zero world? 
 This article argues that Multi-National Corporations (“MNCs”) have a 
unique capacity to address critical global challenges precisely because of the 
qualities that distinguish MNCs from nation-state actors and IGOs.  Because 
MNCs are, by definition, simultaneously local and global, and because their 
constituencies include consumers on the ground and shareholders from all corners 
of the world, MNCs have incentives to invest in the SDGs that nation-state actors 
do not have.27  By highlighting the different incentives that govern MNCs and 
sovereign states, this article will explain why MNCs may be a better bet than 
nations when it comes to addressing complex and enduring problems like climate 
change and poverty eradication. 
MNCs can and should play a role in advancing core global values articulated 
in the SDGs, but it is by no means certain—nor even particularly likely—that they 
will do so.  As critics point out, MNCs have historically acted, and continue to act, 
in ways that are profoundly destructive for local communities, the world’s most 
vulnerable citizens, and the environment.28  The exploitation of natural resources is 
just the most glaring example of this problem.  British consulting firm Trucost 
reported to the United Nations that just 3,000 corporations cause USD 2.15 trillion 
                                                          
22 Bid Begins to Find Trillions for UN’s Post 2015 Goals, UN NEWS AND MEDIA (Mar. 24, 2015), http://w 
ww.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2015/03/bid-begins-to-find-trillions-for-uns-post-2015-
goals/#.VRL5e_zF_Nh (last visited May 16, 2015). 
23 Id. 
24 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEV. INDICATORS DATABASE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2013 (Apr. 14, 2014), 
available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 
25 ICESDF, DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES: SUBMISSION TO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FINANCING § 4.1 (2014), available at http://devinit.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/D
evelopment-Initiatives_ICESDF-Submission-May-2014_Final.pdf. 
26 Unsustainable Goals, ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/international/ 
21647307-2015-will-be-big-year-global-governance-perhaps-too-big-unsustainable-goals. 
27 Dima Jimali, The CSR of MNC Subsidiaries in Developing Countries: Global, Local, Substantive or 
Diluted, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS (2010)181, 181–200. 
28 The literature on this is voluminous.  See, e.g., Behind the Mask: The Real Face of CSR, CHRISTIAN AID 
(2000), https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/csear/app2practice-docs/CSEAR_behind-the-mask.pdf. 
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in environmental damage every year.29  There is also no guarantee that MNCs that 
invest in sustainable development are, on balance, contributing to desirable goals 
like economic empowerment and reduced carbon emissions.  Energy companies, 
for example, may substantially invest in educational initiatives, public health 
campaigns, or environmental sustainability programs, but these efforts are dwarfed 
by harm they do to the environment and the livelihoods of local people.30 
For all the justifiable concern about MNCs playing the role of “change-
agents,” this new political-economic configuration has become ubiquitous.  MNCs 
spend billions of dollars each year on Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) and 
philanthropic initiatives, and NGOs working on environmental sustainability, 
economic empowerment, education, and gender equality all rely heavily on 
corporate sponsors.31  Even traditionally extractive, high-impact industries are 
working hard to present themselves as good global citizens.32 
Corporate Social Responsibility is becoming a byword for MNCs, and 
voices from the European Commission and World Bank to Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International agree that CSR can help build a more “just, equitable, 
and inclusive” future.33  In a geopolitical moment where the most powerful nation-
state actors have political and economic disincentives to collaborate, perhaps 
MNCs offer some grounds for hope.34  And there is simply no time to waste on any 
number of issues, from reversing carbon emissions and building more resilient 
communities, to empowering women and planning for sustainable growth.35  
                                                          
29 Putting a Price on Global Environmental Damage, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (Oct. 5, 
2010), available at http://www.trucost.com/news-2010/100/putting-a-price-on-global-environmental-damage.  This 
is, of course, just the tip of the iceberg, with major global players regularly externalizing environmental costs, in part 
by shifting the real costs of extraction, production, and transportation to a global public. 
30 Many activists remain unwavering in their criticism of CSR, arguing that it privatizes functions 
traditionally executed by the state, outsourcing health, education, and social welfare to organizations that are 
fundamentally concerned with maximizing profits.  These critics argue that global asymmetries offer a convenient 
cover for a creeping neo-liberal agenda that will ultimately dismantle international regulatory frameworks.  Surendra 
Pratap, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Political Agenda of the Corporate, ASIA MONITOR RESOURCE 
CENTER (Nov. 25, 2014), available at http://www.amrc.org.hk/node/1211.  These criticisms are certainly part of the 
story, though it is unclear whether the world’s most vulnerable citizens are as concerned about neo-liberalism as are 
academics and activists. 
31 See, e.g., Sarah Frostenson & Megan O’Neil, 10 Companies That Gave the Most Cash in 2013, THE 
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (July 13, 2014), https://philanthropy.com/article/10-Companies-That-Gave-the/150507 
(America’s ten largest corporate donors made more than $2.2 billion in charitable donations in 2013). 
32 See DINAH RAJAK, IN GOOD COMPANY: AN ANATOMY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2012). 
33 The EC defines CSR as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
A RENEWED EU STRATEGY 2011–14 FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/csr/new-csr/act_en.pdf. 
34 Christian Parenti, A Radical Approach to the Climate Crisis, DISSENT (2013), http://www.dissentmagazine 
.org/article/a-radical-approach-to-the-climate-crisis (last visited May 16, 2015). 
35 Critics observe that this “imperative to act” is regularly used by government and corporate actors to 
advance questionable agendas, from austerity to climate engineering.  I leave it to the reader to decide whether 
climate change, for example, is a pressing enough problem to demand immediate action.  See ANDREA 
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This article argues that MNCs have the capacity to address critical global 
challenges, that they have numerous incentives to invest in Sustainable 
Development, and that the SDGs are just one among many reasons that CSR is on 
its way to becoming Standard Operating Procedure for many of the 500 largest 
corporations in the world, that account for roughly 70 percent of global trade.36  
Part II explores the corporate capacity to “do-good” by making sustainable 
development a core part of business practices.37  Many observers claim that MNCs 
have a unique capacity to “do-good” better because they have financial, 
technological, and human resources that NGOs typically do not have.38  These 
observers believe that MNCs are agile, entrepreneurial, and results-oriented in a 
way that highly bureaucratic governmental organizations are not.  Part II also 
offers an alternative explanation, arguing that NGOs and IGOs working to advance 
Sustainable Development should look to MNCs not because they “do-good better,” 
as many advocates claim, but because their transnational logic provides them with 
rich incentives to invest in goals articulated in the SDGs. 
Part III analyzes different ways that CSR provides MNCs with a Social 
License to Operate.  Historically, MNCs have not prioritized investment in local 
communities, and this has regularly created friction between MNCs domiciled in 
the richest countries, and Civil Society Actors (“CSAs”) in the developing world.39  
In politically unstable regions, this can dramatically undermine MNCs in their 
ability to maintain a baseline of security.40   A comprehensive CSR strategy can 
help MNCs move beyond physical security to civil society partnerships, creating a 
Social License to Operate. 
Part IV explores different economic incentives for MNCs to invest in 
sustainable development.  This section demonstrates that making CSR a core part 
of strategic planning makes financial sense through focusing on public relations 
and branding, shareholder value, and market penetration. 
Part V highlights indicators which suggest that CSR may be on its way to 
becoming Standard Operating Procedure.  As investment and sovereign wealth 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
MUEHLENBACH, THE MORAL NEO-LIBERAL: WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP IN ITALY (2012); see also CLIVE 
HAMILTON, EARTHMASTERS: THE DAWN OF THE AGE OF CLIMATE ENGINEERING (2013). 
36 WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE LIBERALISATION STATISTICS http://www.gatt.org/trastat_e.html (last visited 
May 16, 2015). 
37 John Elkington, Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win-Win-Win Business Strategies for Sustainable 
Development, 36 CAL. MGMT. REV. 90 (1994). 
38 See OLIVER WILLIAMS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (2013); see also PETER AND CRAIG WILSON, MAKE POVERTY BUSINESS: INCREASE PROFITS AND 
REDUCE RISKS BY ENGAGING WITH THE POOR (2006). 
39 SRI URIP, CSR STRATEGIES: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A COMPETITIVE EDGE IN EMERGING 
MARKETS 23 (2010). 
40 See U. Idemudia, Corporate Social Responsibility and Conflict in the Niger Delta: Issues and Prospects, in  
OIL AND INSURGENCY IN THE NIGER DELTA: MANAGING THE COMPLEX POLITICS OF PETROVIOLENCE 167-83 (O. 
Cyril and S. A. Rustad, eds., 2011). 
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funds, private foundations, and NGOs leverage capital flows and public opinion, 
MNCs are coming under increased pressure to invest in a more sustainable, 
socially responsible manner.  The article concludes by “bringing the state back 
in,”41 and argues that the Sustainable Development Goals are part of a larger trend 
that is making CSR strongly normative.  It remains to be seen whether the 
initiatives currently being negotiated will be adequate in the face of critical 
challenges like climate change.   
II. DO MNCS “DO-GOOD” BETTER? MOVING BEYOND THE “CORPORATE 
 CAPACITY” ARGUMENT 
Corporate Social Responsibility emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in response 
to growing concerns about the social and environmental harms done by business.42  
In the 1990s, though, a new class of social entrepreneurs43 began to argue that the 
private sector could make a measurable impact on problems that governments were 
unable to solve. 44  Advocates of CSR argue that it is time to apply business models 
and an entrepreneurial approach to the complicated issues.  The Skoll Foundation, 
for example, claims to “have identified . . . extraordinary leaders . . . [who] are 
creating the innovative models that can spark large-scale change for seemingly 
intractable social problems.”  As they explain:  
 
[e]very one of our social entrepreneurs operates with other players in 
a complex ecosystem with entrenched interests that resist change–but 
timing is everything.  There are moments when the dynamics of an 
ecosystem shift—an inflection point—when changes in the ecosystem 
present opportunities to act that will have outsized impact.45 
 
In this way, the Skoll Foundation advocates for the business model approach to 
social problems. 
                                                          
41 See PETER EVANS ET AL., BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (1985). 
42 See Wayne Visser, CSR 2.0: The Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: 
HOW TO MANAGE A CSR STRATEGY SUCCESSFULLY 311 (Manfred Pohl and Nick Tolhurst, eds., 2010). 
43 This view has contributed substantially to the “Rise of Social Entrepreneurship,” which sees innovators 
attempting to blend purpose with profit.  The Rise of Social Entrepreneurship Suggests a Possible Future for Global 
Capitalism, FORBES (May 2, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/skollworldforum/2013/05/02/the-rise-of-social-
entrepreneurship-suggests-a-possible-future-for-global-capitalism.  For an early contribution to the literature on 
social entrepreneurship, see CHARLES LEADBEATER, THE RISE OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1997). 
44 Voluntary Associations and NGOs also respond to perceived gaps in government capacity, but unlike 
corporate actors, these efforts have not typically included an indictment of the role of governmental intervention and 
regulation.  CAN NGOS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES (Anthony J. 
Bebbington et al., eds., 2008). 
45 Approach, SKOLL FOUNDATION, http://www.skollfoundation.org/approach/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
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“Thought leaders” argue that organizations working on the world’s most 
difficult problems need to be lean, agile, and entrepreneurial,46 and this view is 
gaining ground even in the public sector.  At the 2006 Business in the Community 
Forum, for example, British Prime Minister David Cameron asked his audience 
“[w]ho better than Coca Cola, a firm with a better distribution network in Sub-
Saharan Africa than any aid agency, to get materials out to needy populations?”47  
Large Multi-Nationals do have extraordinary tools at their disposal, including 
financial resources, communication and distribution infrastructure, and access to 
government and civic leaders.48  But is this technical capacity and entrepreneurial 
ethos really the reason that MNCs are uniquely positioned to “do-good” better?  
Leaders from both the public and private sector argue that entrepreneurs 
“do-good” better, but it is not at all clear that initiatives that leverage business 
models are actually more effective than established NGOs or IGOs in achieving 
desired outcomes.  Micro-finance has made important impacts in South Asia,49 as 
has the distribution of antiretroviral therapies to combat the spread of HIV/AIDs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.50  In both these cases, MNCs have played an important role.  
However, their impact relative to initiatives sponsored by the Red Cross, Catholic 
Charities Global, USAID, German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit), the World Health Organization, 
and the World Bank is yet to be determined.  CSR may, in other words, be more 
efficient, innovative, and accountable than (inter) governmental and non-
governmental initiatives, but this is by no means self-evident.  
 Applying business models to NGOs can also have unintended consequences. 
In an effort to secure funding from corporations that seek measurable outcomes, 
many small NGOs have added full-time grant writers to the staff, significantly 
increasing the costs of administering their programs.51  In some cases, NGOs have 
been criticized for the high salaries paid to development and executive officers, 
many of whom are drawn from the corporate sector.52  The Ford Foundation’s Lisa 
Jordan cites one example where a CEO for a well-established Dutch NGO 
                                                          
46 For a good example of this kind of thinking, see Ryan Seashore, Run a Non-Profit like a Startup to Move 
Fast and Help Things, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 6, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/06/run-a-nonprofit-like-a-
startup-to-move-fast-and-help-things/.  It is not evident which “things” Seashore proposes to “help.” 
47 RAJAK, supra note 32, at 29. 
48 Id. at 7.  
49 CSR Initiatives of Citi India, CSR WORLD, available at http://csrworld.net/csr-initiatives-of-citi-india.asp 
(last visited May 1, 2015). 
50 RAJAK, supra note 32, at 116–41. 
51 Kim Reimann, Up to No Good? Recent Critics and Critiques of NGOs, in SUBCONTRACTING PEACE: THE 
CHALLENGES OF NGO PEACEBUILDING 37 (Oliver Richmond & Henry Carey eds., 2005). 
52 JEM BENDELL, DEBATING NGO ACCOUNTABILITY, U.N. NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERVICE DEV. 
DOSSIERS, ix (2006) (“To illustrate, in just a few months major US newspapers such as the New York Times, 
Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal published over 30 articles about the ethical failures of such organizations. 
They flagged the sky-high salaries of top executives, and expenses for offices, travel and other perks.”). 
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reportedly earned more than the Prime Minister of the Netherlands.53  The benefits 
accruing to NGOs that employ grant writers, consultants, and business leaders in 
order to optimize results need to be measured against the costs of doing so.54   
Advocates of CSR may cite entrepreneurship, innovation, and efficiencies as 
the reasons that corporations are positioned to “do-good” better.  Ultimately, 
though, MNCs have the capacity to be powerful partners in the fight to protect the 
global commons because their incentive structure is fundamentally different from 
the one that governs nation-state actors.  Unlike nation-states that are constrained 
by citizens who live within borders, MNCs answer to constituencies that are likely 
to be open to more global intervention rather than less.  MNC constituencies are 
made up of the shareholders who are inclined to support actions that are perceived 
to raise revenue.  If CSR continues to make good business sense out of “doing-
good,” shareholders are unlikely to raise objections.  MNCs have a second 
constituency that makes more global CSR an attractive proposition, and that is the 
local consumer in target markets.  By enhancing their presence in local markets 
through initiatives that are seen as improving the quality of life, MNCs can build 
their relationship with potential consumers in tangible and intangible ways.55  
Unlike nation-state actors, who must convince reluctant voters that foreign aid 
dollars are worth spending, MNCs can satisfy their two main constituencies by 
making sustainable development a core part of strategic planning. 
III. INCENTIVES TO ADVANCE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: BEYOND PHYSICAL 
 SECURITY TO CIVIL SOCIETY PARTNERSHIPS 
Many observers claim that MNCs have a capacity to “do-good” better than 
NGOs, nation-states, and IGOs because of their entrepreneurial ethos and technical 
know-how.  The previous section challenges these claims, suggesting that MNCs 
have the potential to impact critical global issues not because of their unique 
competencies, but because of their particular incentive structure.  The following 
section explores one important incentive that is often overlooked, examining the 
way that CSR can help MNCs enhance “security” in politically unstable regions.  It 
                                                          
53 Lisa Jordan, Mechanisms for NGO Accountability, GLOBAL PUB. POL. INST. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 3 
at 6 (2005). 
54 The effort to create accountability within the NGO sector raises other potential problems.  In some 
instances, the drive for efficiency means that initiatives are funded with unrealistic timelines.  Programming in 
cultural exchange, education, gender equality, and environmental sustainability are all investments that yield results 
over mid to long-term horizons that are not easily measured by traditional accounting techniques.  See Danilo 
Songco, The Evolution of NGO Accountability Practices and Their Implications on Philippine NGOs. A Literature 
Review and Options Paper for the Philippine Council for NGO Certification, available at 
http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/philippines-evolution-of-ngo-accountability-implications.pdf (last visited 
May 1, 2014). 
55 Mark S. Blodgett et al., Sustaining the Financial Value of Global CSR: Reconciling Corporate and 
Stakeholder Interests in a Less Regulated Environment, 119 BUS. AND SOC’Y REV. 95, 95–124 (2014).  
JUNE 2015 WHO LEADS IN A G-ZERO WORLD?  
 
599 
argues that MNCs can achieve a baseline of security in politically unstable regions 
by making investments in education, infrastructure, economic empowerment, 
gender equality, and environmental protection.  CSR can play a key role building a 
predictable, efficient, and secure working environment for MNCs.  When talking 
about MNCs, the obvious place to start is with basic principles of capitalism. 
The most thoughtful observers of capitalism, including Max Weber, Fernand 
Braudel, and Giovanni Arrighi, have all shown that global exchange thrives only 
when a certain baseline of security exists. 56  In an ideal situation, the state will 
enforce the rule of law, contract obligations, and the sanctity of private property, 
and it is able to do so because, at least in the most developed capitalist economies, 
the state possesses “the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.”57  The 
state, in other words, can potentially deploy violence—whether in the form of 
police enforcement, imprisonment, or, in some cases, execution—in order to 
preserve the core pillars of a modern capitalist society.  For organizations operating 
in the developed world, the state plays a key role in ensuring the rule of law, 
contract, and private property.58  A baseline of “security” can be expected. 
The problem of “security” for MNCs operating in a global context, though, 
is rather different.  It is not only that MNCs have to negotiate the complexities of 
international law, local customs, and unfamiliar political constellations.59  They 
must also operate in a fundamentally different “security” environment.60  What 
happens when corporations domiciled in London, New York, Frankfurt or Tokyo 
operate in countries where the state is unable to guarantee contract, private 
property, and the rule of law?61  Political Scientist Joel Migdal called these “Strong 
Societies” with “Weak States,” and in countries of this sort, religious, ethnic, or 
political groups may supply the goods and services—from health care to food and 
sanitation—that the state is unable to deliver. 62  In strong societies with weak 
states, the ability to enforce the rule of law, contract, and private property is 
fundamentally contested.  Who, then, guarantees “security” in its broad sense, 
                                                          
56 GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES 
(2010); FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE (Siân Reynolds trans., 1992); MAX WEBER, THE THEORY 
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons trans., 1947). 
57 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in MAX WEBER. ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77–128 (H. H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills trans. 1946). 
58 RAJAK, supra note 32, at 27. 
59 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CSR (Gϋler Aras and David Crowther eds., 
2009). 
60 Dima Jimali, CSR in Developing Countries Through an Institutional Lens, in CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY: EMERGING TRENDS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 21 (Gabriel Edejwe ed., 
2014). 
61 RAJAK, supra note 32, at 27. 
62 JOEL MIGDAL, STRONG SOCIETIES AND WEAK STATES: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND STATE 
CAPABILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1988).  Recent examples might include Colombia, Palestine, Egypt, or 
Pakistan. 
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ensuring that property will not be expropriated, contracts will be fulfilled, and 
safety can be expected?  These are questions that MNCs regularly face, particularly 
when operating in politically contested regions. 63   
Historically, MNCs have allied with the state, even in situations where the 
state was weak and society was strong.  This is understandable, because even weak 
states maintain nominal control of legal, political, and military institutions, and are 
typically recognized by international bodies.64 This approach to the security 
problem, though, has the potential to generate conflicts over the long-term, 
alienating key elements in civil society and/or contenders for political power. Here, 
CSR has the potential to generate relationships across ethnic, religious, political, 
and cultural differences.65   
Making strategic investments to promote the Sustainable Development 
Goals can help MNCs build ties with diverse political and civil-society 
stakeholders. Furthermore, MNCs that invest in core SDGs like improved 
sanitation, food security, health infrastructure, and economic empowerment are in 
a position to build these relationships without becoming enmeshed in historical, 
current, or potential contests for power. This is a level of political risk management 
that MNCs have not explored, but it is a fundamental principle of the most 
established Aid Agencies.66 In operating environments where political control may 
change hands frequently, or where authority is fragmented across physical, ethno-
religious, or cultural geographies, investing in local communities is one way to 
build the trust that will be necessary to ensure property, contract, and the rule of 
law in the absence of a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force.67  
It is worth pointing out that this “anti-political” approach can be 
extraordinarily cynical: in some cases, MNCs may avoid investing in some of the 
SDGs in the hopes of side-stepping politically contested issues. Faced with the 
metastasis of Boko Haram in Nigeria, for example, MNCs scrambling to enter the 
                                                          
63 MNCs clearly recognize that political uncertainty, corruption, and the lack of transparency have the 
potential to deform civil society and the basic mechanisms of exchange.  These were just some of the topics 
addressed at a recent Transparency International Conference in Berlin. Transparency International, 5th Annual 
Conference on the Future of Corporate Social Responsibility (Berlin) (Oct. 4–6, 2012). 
64   For example, in Yemen, Libya, and Egypt. 
65 This can be described as an “anti-politics”, where diverse and sometimes hostile groups create consensus 
around a particular issue.  On the concept of an anti-politics, see GYÖRGI KONRÁD, ANTI-POLITICS: AN ESSAY 
(1984). For a brief introduction that addresses some key elements of anti-politics, see Avi Sharma, Anti-Politics of 
Health: Consensus and Conflict in the German Natural Healing Movement, 1890-1910, 10 CIRCUMSCRIBERE 66 
(2011). 
66 Adam Grove, NGOs in New Wars: Neutrality or New Humanism? (Mar. 15, 2008) (unpublished student 
essay, Oxford University) (on file with E-International Relations Students); Denise Plattner, ICRC Neutrality and 
Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance, 311 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 161 (1996); Lyal S. Sunga, Relief 
Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality, and Solidarity, in 
DEVELOPMENT, WOMEN AND WAR: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Haleh Afshar and Deborah Eade, eds., 2004). 
67 Weber, supra note 57. 
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Nigerian market may explicitly ignore issues like gender equality and equal access 
to education for girls in order to avoid antagonizing violent non-state actors.68  
Neutrality also, in some cases, provides a convenient cover for businesses 
unwilling to terminate lucrative contracts in conflict zones.69  These troubling 
ethical questions are outside the scope of the present article.  However, it is clear 
that MNCs have an incentive to make targeted investments in Sustainable 
Development as part of a strategy for sustained growth in politically unstable 
regions. 
This point is not lost on politically savvy corporate executives, who 
recognize that CSR potentially contributes to political stability, increased 
efficiency, and better civil-society partnerships.  In 2006, the Chairman of London 
based mining giant Anglo-American told an audience in London that “some 70% 
of our operations are in developing countries, in many of them government 
capacities are limited or lacking, institutions are often weak and poverty is a major 
challenge.’’70  Another Anglo-American executive put the matter more simply: 
“We want to do business with [your government], but in various ways you make it 
very difficult.  Let us help you do away with those difficulties.’’71  These candid 
statements show that CSR can function as a tool of political risk mitigation; the 
kinder, gentler arm of a strategy that aims to create security.72  
 
IV. CSR IS GOOD BUSINESS AND A “REPUTATIONAL IMPERATIVE”: GLOBAL 
SHAREHOLDERS AND LOCAL CONSUMERS 
 
CSR can enhance the security environment in politically volatile regions by 
forging relationships with civil-society partners, but investment in sustainable 
development has also proven that it can generate measurable returns for 
shareholders.  The following section details some of the ways that robust CSR 
programming makes good investment sense, before exploring the partnership 
between Unilever and more than 60,000 village women across India.73  The 
                                                          
68 See Fiona Fox, New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century, 25 
DISASTERS 275 (2001). See also Fiona Fox, Conditioning the Right to Humanitarian Aid, Human Rights and the 
New Humanitarianism, in RETHINKING HUMAN RIGHTS, (David Chandler, ed., 2002).  
69 Michael Peel, Iran, Russia and China Prop Up Assad economy, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 27, 2013), 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79eca81c-df48-11e2-a9f4-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Vn43YsIl. 
70 RAJAK, supra note 32, at 52. 
71 Id. at 54. 
72 Siri Moen, Managing Political Risk: Corporate Social Responsibility as a Risk Mitigation Tool – A Focus 
on Niger Delta, Southern Nigeria, 43 AFR. INSIGHT 90 (2013).  This is something that nation-state actors also do, 
and “soft power” has long been an important dimension of foreign policy.  Unfortunately, budgets for international 
development work, cultural and educational exchange programing, and other initiatives aimed at creating peace etc. 
tend to be first on the cutting block when it comes to foreign aid spending. 
73 Project Shakti. Creating rural entrepreneurs in India, UNILEVER (2005), available at 
http://www.unilever.tt/Images/es_Project_Shakti_tcm195-13297.pdf. 
 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 3 
 
   
 
602 
Unilever case—also known as the “Shakti revolution”—shows that investing in 
Sustainable Development Goals like educational and economic empowerment for 
women and girls, better sanitation and health infrastructure, public-private 
partnerships, and innovative finance for sustainable economic growth can yield 
substantial Return on Investment (“ROI”) at the “Bottom of the Pyramid,” which 
comprises of billions of the world’s poorest consumers.74    
 
A. “Doing Good”—A Reputational Imperative  
 
When it comes to “doing-good,” measuring ROI is a difficult undertaking, 
but there is growing evidence that CSR is a good investment.  A recent USA 
Today survey, for example, discovered that 90 percent of consumers polled across 
ten countries would boycott a firm perceived to be engaged in irresponsible or 
risky practices.75  According to a recent study undertaken by CONE 
Communications, 91 percent of consumers believe that “companies must go 
beyond the minimum standards required by law” to fulfill their social 
responsibilities, while more than 80 percent of consumers consider CSR when 
deciding where to work, what to buy, where to shop, and which products to 
recommend to family, friends, and colleagues.76  According to PR specialists, CSR 
has become a “reputational imperative” in the age of social media.77  Although 
advertising and communications firms have a clear incentive in promoting CSR 
and the public relations work that comes with it, there is growing evidence to 
support this claim.  Organizations like Edelmann78 and the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development (“WBCSD”)79 are just two of the many organizations 
tracking the relationship between good corporate citizenship and brand loyalty.80 
                                                          
74 C.K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING POVERTY THROUGH 
PROFITS (2005). 
75 Jayne O’Donnell, Survey: Most Would Boycott Irresponsible Company, USA TODAY (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/05/21/consumers-boycott-companies-bad-behavior-gap-
protests/2343619/. 
76 Press Release, Cone Communications, Cone Releases the 2013 Cone Communications/Echo Global CSR 
Study (May 22, 2013) available at http://www.conecomm.com/2013-global-csr-study-release. 
77 Archie Obrien, 10 Ways to Measure the ROI of Public Relations, EVERYTHING PR (Feb. 23, 2013), 
available at http://everything-pr.com/roi-public-relations/241033/#.UjD448afjV5. 
78 2013 Edelman Trust Barometer, EDELMAN, http://www.edelman.com/insights/intellectual-property/trust-
2013/ (last visited May 1, 2014). 
79 THE WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (WBCSD), GLOBAL SCENARIOS 2000-2050: 
EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1997). 
80 Major stock indexes, including Dow Jones, DAX, NASDAQ, and FTSE also measure CSR and SRI.  In 
addition, there are the influential UN Social Responsibility Investment Index and the Global Impact Investment 
Rating System (GIIRS).  Some are critical of the so-called “ratings game,” noting that the diverse metrics used to 
evaluate CSR, SRI, and Impact Investing vary dramatically, and in many cases, fail to create a coherent framework 
for measuring the effectiveness of Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives.  See Michael Porter & Mark Kramer, 
Strategy and Society: the Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, 84 HARVARD 
BUS. REV. 78 (2006). 
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B.  Measuring Return on Investment  
 
If some traditional investors are unconvinced by these qualitative measures 
of ROI, there are some hard numbers that suggest that inclusion in Social 
Responsibility Indices correlates strongly with increased shareholder value.  A 
Joint Paper published by the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of Finland, for 
example, showed that from 1990 to 2004, stocks that were dropped from a major 
Socially Responsible Investing (“SRI”) Index experienced an average 3 percent 
decline in share price.81  Another study conducted over the period 2000-2007 
showed that inclusion in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index amounted to a “boost 
in market value of about 2% compared to stocks that were dropped [from the 
index].”82  The Asset Management Working Group of the UN Environment 
Programme even suggested that SRI, including investment in economic 
empowerment, education, and sustainability, could be treated as a proxy for good 
corporate governance.83  In this view, investment in CSR is often perceived by 
investors as a way of evaluating the mid to long-term value of publicly traded 
companies.84  While there is still work to be done in quantifying ROI, there are a 
number of indicators that suggest that MNCs should invest in Sustainable 
Development if they hope to satisfy their constituencies, including shareholders. 
 
C.  The “Bottom of the Pyramid” and Sustainable Development  
 
For traditional investors who are still doubtful about the calculus of 
investing in Sustainable Development, the “Bottom of the Pyramid” (“BoP”) 
strategy points to another way that CSR can create shareholder value and build the 
conditions for sustainable economic growth.  The BoP is a well-known business 
development model popularized by C.K. Prahalad in his 2004 book “Fortune at the 
Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits”.85  Prahalad and 
others argued that MNCs could simultaneously expand their global market share, 
                                                          
81 TERENCE LIM, MEASURING THE VALUE OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: SOCIAL IMPACTS, BUSINESS 
BENEFITS, AND INVESTOR RETURNS 57, 58 (2010).  
82 Id. 
83  Id. at 58.  See also The Asset Management Working Group, Demystifying Responsible Investment 
Performance – A Review of Key Academic and Broker Research on ESG Factors, UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE 
(2007), available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Demystifying_Responsible_Investment_Performan
ce_01.pdf (providing overview of research). 
84 This is precisely the justification offered by Norwegian Pension funds as they divest from high impact 
industries like coal and gold mining.  2014 Responsible Investment Government Pension Fund Global, NORGES 
BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, available at http://www.nbim.no/globalassets/reports/2014/2014-responsible-
investment.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014); see also LIM, supra note 81, at 59. 
85 PRAHALAD, supra note 74. 
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increase profits, energize developing economies, and empower the world’s most 
vulnerable citizens by concentrating not on low volume and high margin sales in 
the developed world, but by inverting that model.86  By generating high volume 
sales at a low margin, MNCs could provide goods and services to consumers in the 
developing world while increasing investor value at home.87  Prahalad argued that 
this was the beginning of a virtuous circle of sustainable business growth and 
economic empowerment.88  As investors look to expand in emerging markets, 
MNCs are increasingly trying to tap into the BoP, which comprises more than four 
billion consumers who have historically existed outside networks of global 
exchange because of poverty or extreme poverty.  Unilever is one well-known 
example of an MNC that has created a plan for sustainable long-term growth by 
empowering the world’s poorest.89 
The BoP created much excitement in investment circles, but it also raised 
objections.  One criticism has implications for the CSR in general and the Unilever 
strategy in particular: Erik Simanis argued in the Harvard Business Review that 
returning a profit based on low margins depends on massive market penetration.90  
While there are questions about the exact figures, Simanis argues that MNCs need 
to capture a baseline of 30 percent market share to make the BoP model work.91  
Achieving this kind of brand recognition and loyalty is no easy task.  But as 
Unilever has shown, economic empowerment, education, and civil-society 
partnerships can be powerful tools to achieve this kind of market penetration.92 
In 2000, Unilever India (now Hindustan Unilever) embarked on the Shakti 
entrepreneurship project, which invited women in two rural villages to act as 
representatives and agents for Unilever products in local communities.93  Shakti 
entrepreneurs take out small loans, typically financed by village collectives and 
                                                          
86 Id. at 24;  see also Rachel E. Ryon, Foreigners in Burma: A Framework for Responsible Investment, 23 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 831, 857 (2014) (applies this reasoning to investment in Burma). 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  The BoP model has much to recommend it, but it also raises concerns.  Richard Heinberg among others 
notes that a “continuous growth” model built on emerging markets has potentially dramatic environmental impacts.  
Advocates of growth driven by economic empowerment of the world’s poorest citizens, though, respond by pointing 
out that increased efficiencies in production, transportation, and distribution can potentially increasing buying power 
at the BoP without expanding the corporate carbon footprint.  This is one key debate for the 21st century, where the 
goals of economic development and environmental sustainability sometimes collide.  See generally RICHARD 
HEINBERG, THE END OF GROWTH: ADAPTING TO OUR NEW ECONOMIC REALITY (2011). 
89  See India: Creating Rural Entrepreneurs, UNILEVER, http://www.unilever.tt/sustainability/casestudies/ 
economic-development/creating-rural-entrepreneurs.aspx (last visited May 16, 2015). 
90 See Erik Simanis, Reality Check at the Bottom of the Pyramid, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2012), available at 
https://hbr.org/2012/06/reality-check-at-the-bottom-of-the-pyramid. 
91 Id.  
92 See Ashish Karamchandani, Mike Kubbzansky & Nishant Lalwani, The Globe: Is the Bottom of the 
Pyramid Really for You?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 2011), available at https://hbr.org/2011/03/the-globe-is-the-
bottom-of-the-pyramid-really-for-you. 
93 Project Shakti, Creating Rural Entrepreneurs in India, UNILEVER, http://www.unilever-
jm.com/Images/es_Project_Shakti_tcm154-141088.pdf (last visited May 16, 2015). 
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microfinanciers, to buy stakes ranging between INR 10,000–15,000 (USD 220–
330) in the Hindustan Unilever operation.94  Operating in local villages, Shakti 
entrepreneurs bring Unilever products to village markets, selling to a difficult to 
reach consumer base.  In addition to their retail work, Shakti entrepreneurs give 
presentations on basic health and hygiene, from hand washing to prenatal and early 
childhood care.95  For communities that are medically underserved, this can be an 
invaluable resource.96 
By the end of 2004, the Unilever initiative had grown to more than 13,000 
Shakti entrepreneurs covering 50,000 villages in twelve states, selling to seventy 
million consumers.97  By 2013, the number of Shakti entrepreneurs had reached 
more than 65,000 women working in 160,000 villages across India.98  The Shakti 
Project has had measurable impacts on the lives of the rural women who became 
agents for Unilever Hindustan because their average income rose by USD 180–260 
annually.99  While these wages are nominal by Western standards, they create an 
important supplement to rural family incomes, which according to a recent World 
Bank Report, average just USD 250 in India.100  As Hindustan Unilever works to 
empower local women entrepreneurs, it is also creating a whole new consumer 
base—one that can be expected to have personal and community ties to the 
brand.101  Shakti entrepreneurs have increased Unilever’s market penetration more 
than three fold in less than fifteen years.102 
The Shakti project did not end with entrepreneurship; in 2004 Unilever 
partnered with the government of the state of Andra Pradhesh, the Azim Premji 
Foundation, TATA Consultancy services, and 300 other partners to provide 
internet enabled computers to select villages.  “Mostly housed in the homes of 
Shakti entrepreneurs, I-Shakti kiosks provide villagers with free access to 
information on a wide range of topics,” including health and hygiene, agriculture, 
                                                          
94 Id. 
95 Facts and Figures: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Links to Health, WORD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who. 
int/water_sanitation_health/publications/factsfigures04/en/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
96 Id.  (quoting Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, “We shall not finally defeat AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, or any of the other infectious diseases that plague the developing world until we have also 
won the battle for safe drinking water, sanitation and basic health care”). 
97 Project Shakti, Creating Rural Entrepreneurs in India, supra note 93. 
98 UNILEVER, HINDUSTAN UNILEVER UNLIMITED ANNUAL REPORT 2013–14: MAKING SUSTAINABLE LIVING 
COMMONPLACE 11 (2014), available at http://www.hul.co.in/Images/HUL-Annual-Report-2013-14_tcm114-
391926.pdf [hereinafter UNILEVER ANNUAL REPORT 2013-14]. 
99 See id. 
100 Gavin Neath & Vijay Sharma, The Shakti Revolution: How the World’s Largest Home-to-Home Operation 
is Changing Lives and Stimulating Economic Activity in Rural India, 10 DEV. OUTREACH 13, 13–16 (2008), 
available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1020-797X-10_2_13. 
101 See William B. Werther Jr. & David Chandler, Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Brand 
Insurance, 48 BUS. HORIZONS 317 (2005). 
102 See UNILEVER ANNUAL REPORT 2013–14, supra note 98. 
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education, finance, employment, and entrepreneurship.103  Sustainable 
Development Initiatives like I-Shakti and Shakti entrepreneurship have been 
impressive in their ability to empower women, but they are also introducing 
potential consumers to core Unilever products, including Pureit (Home Water 
Purification Devices), Domex (household cleaning products), and Lifebuoy 
(“health soap”). 
In this case, a comprehensive CSR strategy simultaneously accomplishes 
multiple objectives.  It empowers thousands of rural women who make up the 
backbone of many local communities; it brings Unilever into tens of thousands of 
local markets that are necessary for the success of any BoP strategy; it builds the 
Unilever global brand; and it creates partnerships with governmental and civil 
society partners.  Hindustan Unilever ultimately hopes to reach 600 million 
consumers in 550,000 Indian villages,104 and it is well on its way to achieving the 
30 percent market-penetration that is one important key to capturing the BoP. 
Unilever has long been a key global player in health, hygiene, and beauty 
products, and its market share continues to expand.  Unlike other MNCs, though, 
Unilever has made socially responsible investing a core component of its business 
strategy.105  Its success in both financial and non-financial indicators shows that a 
plan for long-term, sustainable growth may be a model for MNCs hoping to 
increase investor value and to build a Social License to Operate (“SLO”).  CSR is a 
rational bet for MNCs concerned with brand image, investor value, and sustainable 
growth.  
At present, we cannot pinpoint why individual MNCs invest in CSR, but one 
thing is very clear.  MNCs have a variety of incentives to look beyond national 
borders, to empower potential consumers, to protect vital natural resources, and to 
make investments in peace and stability.  Unlike nation-state actors that are 
structurally disposed towards a parochial view of international affairs, MNCs can 
satisfy their “constituencies” by taking an internationalist view of global affairs.  
 
V. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AT THE INTERSECTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: 
 GLOBAL GOOD CITIZENSHIP AS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 
 
Publicity, market penetration, and shareholder satisfaction are important 
factors that influence corporate decision making about CSR investment, but there 
are numerous other reasons to think that CSR is becoming Standard Operating 
                                                          
103 Manoj K. Dash, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Entrepreneurship in India: Exploring The 
Landscape Of Possibilities, in IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: INDIAN PERSPECTIVES 85, 92-
93 (Subhasis Ray & S. Silva Raju, eds., 2014).   
104 See UNILEVER ANNUAL REPORT 2013–14, supra note 98. 
105 Urip, supra note 39. 
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Procedure for major Multi-Nationals.  As investment funds, governmental actors, 
and civil-society partners call on MNCs to make sustainable development 
initiatives a part of their corporate mission, savvy executives are beginning to 
recognize that CSR is not just a question of competitive advantage.  As we see 
below, investing in Sustainable Development through CSR may be the cost of 
doing business in Developing and Least Developed Countries.  
Civil-society, philanthropic, and intergovernmental actors are all playing an 
increasingly important role in generating corporate commitments to invest in 
sustainable development.  The UN-supported Principles of Responsible Investing 
(“PRI”) Initiative, launched in 2005 with the help of Secretary General Kofi Annan 
reports that “as of May 2008, approximately 300 financial institutions representing 
$15 trillion in professionally managed assets have subscribed to the UN Principles 
for Responsible Investment.”106  Organizations like the Clinton Foundation are also 
playing a role, leveraging strategic relationships with high-asset individuals and 
corporate partners to address critical global challenges.107  For example, in 2013 
the Clinton Foundation secured a commitment from InterEnergy, worth $100 
million, to increase the use of renewable energy in Latin America.108  Although 
adherence to these commitments is voluntary and non-binding, signatories are 
raising baseline expectations for Corporate Social Responsibility.  Initiatives like 
those supported by the UN PRI and the Clinton Foundation have the potential to 
influence corporate decision making and incentivize investment in Sustainable 
Development among organizations reluctant to make that commitment.109 
In-flows of capital are also influencing corporate decision-making.  As 
institutional investors deploy their financial resources to promote the SDGs, 
publicly traded MNCs will be forced to reevaluate their spending priorities.110  
Swedish and Norwegian Pension funds capitalized with roughly USD 1 trillion, for 
example, “recently signed on to the Sustainable Value Creation Initiative (“SVC”) 
to influence companies to improve the social and environmental aspects of their 
operations, which they believe reduce risks and cost while harnessing and 
developing business opportunities.”111  This amounts to more than 100 percent of 
                                                          
106  Lim, supra note 81, at 58; See UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, PRI REPORT 
ON PROGRESS 2008 (2008), available at http://2xjmlj8428u1a2k5o34l1m71.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008PRI_Report_on_Progress.pdf. 
107  See About Us, THE CLINTON FOUND., https://www.clintonfoundation.org/about (last visited May 16, 2015). 
108  Million Investment in Latin America’s Renewable Energy, THE CLINTON FOUND., 
https://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/100-million-investment-latin-americas-
renewable-energy (last visited May 16, 2015). 
109  See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. OF 
INT’L L. 819 (2007). 
110  See David Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55 (2005). 
111  Lim, supra note 81, at. 57-58. 
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the combined GDP of the two Scandinavian countries.112  The numbers still vary 
dramatically across global markets, and investment in sustainable growth is 
considerably less developed in the US, although still substantial.  The Japanese 
External Trade Organization reported that in the US, roughly USD 2.3 trillion “is 
being invested in companies that rate highly on some measure of ‘doing-good,’” 
amounting to roughly 15 percent of GDP.113  It is worth noting that, in all of the 
cases described above, CSR and investment in Sustainable Development is 
“voluntary.”  However, MNCs are under growing pressure—from institutional 
investors, philanthropic groups, NGOs, and peer organizations—to make a 
commitment to sustainable development. NGOs, Foundations, and IGOs are 
creating new norms that MNCs will find increasingly difficult to ignore.114 
There is a final factor which explains why CSR may become Standard 
Operating Procedure for MNCs.  Over the past decade, government officials, 
activists, and civil-society leaders in developing economies have become 
increasingly vocal in demanding that MNCs invest in local communities.115  For 
example, after years of massive investment in the resource-rich parts of Africa, 
Chinese investment is encountering resistance from civil-society actors as well as 
regional and national governments who are concerned by a perceived resource-
grab by the economic powerhouse.116  In 2013, responding in part to concerns 
voiced by African leaders, Chinese “concessional loans” and foreign aid to Africa 
retroactively doubled to USD 20 billion per year from 2012 to 2015.117  Chinese 
firms operating in Africa have also been increasing spending on professional 
development and public health clinics, also in response to frictions with local 
partners.118  Local expectations are turning voluntary CSR initiatives into de facto 
                                                          
112  More recently still, the Norwegian Oil Fund, valued at roughly USD $860 billion, announced that it would 
divest from corporations with unsustainable business models.  Richard Milne, Norway Oil Fund Reveals 
Divestments and Resolution Rejections, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cef444fe-ad1a-11e4-
bfcf-00144feab7de.html#axzz3aLyL0nIX; see also NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., 2014 RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL (2014), available at http://www.nbim.no/globalassets/reports/2014/2014-
responsible-investment.pdf. 
113 See JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: AN AFRICAN CASE STUDY 
(FINDINGS AND RESEARCH MAINLY SOUTH AFRICAN BASED) 17 (2009), available at 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/pdf/csr_all.pdf. 
114 See Larry Catá Backer, Governing Corporations: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Obligations of 
States, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 503, (2008); See Weissbrodt, supra note 110. 
115 See Backer, supra note 114. 
116 Yun Sun, Africa in China’s Foreign Policy, THE BROOKINGS INST. 27 (Apr. 2014), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/04/africa-china-policy-sun/africa-in-china-
web_cmg7.pdf. 
117 Id. at 8. 
118 ROCKEFELLER BUS. FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, CHINA’S RISING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. IS THERE ROOM FOR 
CSR? (2008). 
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requirements to work in emerging markets, and as investment in Africa grows, 
politicians are likely to expect more rather than less from global investors.119 
In Africa, the expectation that MNCs will invest in local communities is still 
informal, but in other parts of the world, CSR investing is finally being codified in 
legal frameworks.  India has already shown that global investors need to be ready 
to make an investment not just in Indian technology, human and natural resources, 
but also in its society and culture.  In 2013, the Indian Ministry of Corporations 
recently released a revised “Companies Act,” which contains draft rules for 
CSR.120  These state that corporations with a net worth of USD 100 million or 
more, or an average net profit of USD 1 million over a period of three years must 
dedicate 2 percent of net inland profit to CSR initiatives.121  This is the first 
initiative of its kind, but it is unlikely to be the last.  Perhaps the nation-state does, 
in fact, have a role to play.  Regulatory regimes can “nudge” MNCs towards 
investing in Sustainable Development.122  The UN Sustainable Development Goals 
are one effort to create an international framework capable of addressing critical 
global challenges.  
 
VI. THE SDGS, NGOS, AND “THE FUTURE WE WANT”: 123 A NEW NORMATIVE 
 FRAMEWORK?  
 
The SDGs are a remarkable exercise in optimism.  They propose to “end . . . 
poverty in all its forms everywhere,” promote concerted action on climate change 
at all levels of society, provide “food security and adequate nutrition for all”, and 
“achieve peaceful and inclusive societies, rule of law, [and] effective and capable 
institutions.”124  The SDGs are the culmination of a decades-long process that 
includes Agenda 21 (1992), the Global Compact (1999), the Millennium 
Development Goals (2000), Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2003), 
and Rio+20 (2012).  Authors of the Zero-draft explicitly reaffirm these 
principles.125  
                                                          
119 DALBERG GLOBAL DEV. ADVISORS, IMPACT INVESTING IN WEST AFRICA (2011) (on file with author). 
120 See The Companies Act, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryV2/companiesact. 
html (last visited May 16, 2015); See also The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, Gazette of India, part II, 
section 1 (Aug. 30, 2013), vol. 27, available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf. 
121 Id. 
122 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
123 “The future we want” was one catchphrase that survived the Rio 2012 conference.  2 Introduction and 
Proposed Goals and Targets on Sustainable Development for the Post2015 Development Agenda, UNITED NATIONS 
DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF. (June 2, 2014), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4528zero-
draft12OWG.pdf.  
124 Id. at 3. 
125 Id. at 2–3. 
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Observers are understandably skeptical that the UN, member states, and 
civil-society partners will realize these goals—particularly since the target deadline 
is just fifteen years away.  However, interpreting the Post-2015 Agenda in this way 
ignores the systemic impact ratification would have: whether or not the SDGs meet 
each of their proposed targets (which they certainly will not), they provide a 
coherent framework for international human rights law that assimilates the 
incremental advances made over more than twenty years.  And while the SDGs are 
“guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN, with full respect 
for international law and its principles,” they also move from proscribed behaviors 
to prescriptions for a “future we want.”126  This may prove vitally important, as the 
international community seeks to mobilize corporations, which have not 
historically been the target of international law.127  
The ambitious scope of the SDGs is, in this view, not a liability but an 
advantage.  Not only do they encompass existing principles of international law 
which define the obligations of nation-state actors, but they cohere with parallel 
frameworks that target the private sector.128  For those who hope that the SDGs 
will eventually provide the foundation for soft-law that can be used to govern the 
practices of MNCs, this is some cause for cautious optimism.129  The debate about 
Sustainable Development and Corporate Social Responsibility may also be 
contributing to a climate where good corporate practices are strongly normative.   
Nonprofits and grassroots advocacy groups are reinforcing the work of 
intergovernmental bodies in making Sustainable Development normative.130  
David Weissbrodt notes that NGOs like OXFAM, Amnesty International, and 
Human Rights Watch are playing an important role in shaping public opinion, and 
encouraging for-profit organizations to invest responsibly,131 and Larry Catá 
Backer argues that there is some hope that global NGOs will “match the power of 
multinationals in the competition for the allegiance of consumers and investors 
                                                          
126 Id. at 1–2. 
127
 See Weissbrodt, supra note 110, at 55; See Backer, supra note 114 at 505; See JENNIFER ZERK, 
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LAW 83 (2006). 
128 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, at 6, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011); see also United Nations Human Rights Office of 
the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
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129 See Thomas McInerney, “Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of Corporate 
Social Responsibility,” 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171 (2007). 
130 The organization Go Fossil Free, for example, has won commitments from hundreds of cities, colleges and 
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Commitments, FOSSIL FREE, http://gofossilfree.org/commitments/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
131 See Weissbrodt, supra note 110. 
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through certification programs and other private contractual mechanisms.”132  
Beyond IGOs and NGOs, Investment and Pension Funds managing trillions of 
dollars are also making an impact, leveraging financial resources to force 
corporations to make CSR a core part of business practices.133  These are all 
encouraging developments, particularly when compared to prevailing conditions 
just twenty years past.  It remains to be seen whether these largely volunteer efforts 
are commensurate with the extraordinary challenges facing the global community, 
or whether a more robust regulatory framework is needed to create the future 
imagined by authors of the SDGs. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The present article argues that the world’s most powerful actors—the Group 
of 7 and the BRICS, e.g.—have disincentives to make the costly investments 
required to address critical global challenges.134  Repeated failures to achieve 
consensus between developing and developed nations to address climate mitigation 
and adaptation is just the most extreme example of this problem.135  If nation-state 
actors are unable to lead in what Ian Bremmer calls the G-Zero world, who will?   
This article suggests that MNCs have the capacity to make a transformative 
impact on critical issues not because of technical capacity, agility, 
entrepreneurship, or supply-chains, as advocates like Jeffrey Skoll and David 
Cameron claim, but because they have incentives that dispose them to more, rather 
than less, global engagement.  Investing in sustainable development by making 
CSR a core part of corporate strategy can build civil-society partnerships in 
developing economies; improve a company’s reputation; enhance shareholder 
value; and increase market penetration.   This article does not endorse a market-
based approach to the “tragedy of the commons.”136  It does argue, however, that 
private sector leadership in the campaign to address issues like climate change, 
economic inequality, and the disenfranchisement of women and girls is preferable 
to no leadership at all.137   
                                                          
132 See Backer, supra note 114. 
133
 See DNV GL, TOMORROW’S VALUE RATING 2014 GLOBAL REPORT (2014).  Ratings agencies like DNV 
GL use indexes of corporate, social, and environmental practices to encourage MNCs to “improve” their behavior. 
134 See BREMMER, supra note 10. 
135 See Jasmin Kominek, Global Climate Policy Reinforces Local Social Path-Dependent Processes: More 
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136 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
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MNCs are already investing in sustainable development, and this article 
shows that the “market” is playing a role in shaping corporate behavior.  However, 
CSR is on its way to becoming Standard Operating Procedure not just because of 
market mechanisms, but because elected officials from Zambia to India are 
demanding that corporations invest in local economies, infrastructure, and 
indigenous populations if they hope to capture market-share at the coveted BoP.138  
The state, in other words, is essential to ensuring that MNCs act in socially 
responsible ways.  
Initiatives sponsored by intergovernmental organizations are also creating a 
framework to enhance the positive impact of MNCs, and the SDGs go some way in 
making CSR normative for for-profit organizations operating on a global scale.  
Critics from both sides of the political spectrum are right to argue that the SDGs 
are unlikely to be achieved: they are extraordinarily costly, they are politically 
contentious, and they mask genuine social, cultural, religious, and political 
differences behind widely agreed upon principles.  The present article has argued, 
however, that interpreting the SDGs in this way ignores the true merits of the UN 
initiative.  If ratified by the General Assembly in late 2015, the SDGs will confer 
genuine obligations to realize the “future we want” on diverse public, private, and 
civil-society stakeholders.  Taken together with the European Commission 
“Strategy for CSR” and the UN “Principles on Business and Human Rights,” the 
SDGs are part of trend that brings the private-sector under the purview of 
international law.  This has long been a dangerous lacunae in global governance.   
Ultimately, the question is whether the trend towards sustainable 
development, principled on market mechanisms and voluntary commitments, can 
eradicate poverty, slow global warming, empower women, and create a more 
peaceful global community.  The answer is, almost certainly, no.  However, as this 
article suggested at the outset, some hope is better than none.   
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